Afghanistan–Pakistan relations - Wikipedia
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations face another test Ghafoor called on Afghanistan to cooperate in border fencing and bilateral border security. Taliban fighters have stepped up their attacks along the Afghan-Pakistani border as the United States hands over control of southern Afghanistan to NATO forces. Afghanistan, and the longevity of the United States and Pakistani relationship. The tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border present a number of.
One panelist argued that the collapse of the malik is one of the most important changes in FATA, along with the declining quality of bureaucratic talent in the Political Agency. Finally, military operations by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq and by Pakistan in the tribal areas have contributed to the ever-shifting social and power structures and the deepening turn toward Islamism and even Islamist militancy in the region.
The Pakistan military's defeats in South and North Waziristan—and concomitant peace deals—have empowered, enriched, emboldened, and legitimized the socio-political role of the mullah, the militants, and their Taliban allies. These operations have led to widespread dissatisfaction and a sense of betrayal among the tribes, as the operations are viewed as excessive and indiscriminate uses of force.
InPakistanis compared these incursions into South Waziristan to Israeli operations against Palestinians. Simply put, it is difficult for many tribal residents to understand how the mullahs and militants, who were once considered heroes and given support during the effort to repel the Soviets from Afghanistan, are now branded as enemies.
These and other factors have contributed to the decline of traditional tribal governing structures and have vitiated the authenticity and legitimacy of the maliks' leadership in particular.
The maliks' diminished standing has been exacerbated by the fact that the political agents have long favored those maliks whose cooperation can be bought over hereditary maliks.
Because the tribes no longer recognize these non-hereditary maliks as their legitimate representation, they have turned to other political forces in their stead, namely charismatic religious and militant leaders.
These new leaders have effectively captured the various forms of simmering discontent within the tribes and have emerged as more legitimate defenders of tribal interests. Thus, the mullahs have now become respected representatives of the tribes, as have key Islamist militants in FATA.
Simultaneously with the decline of the malik and the ascendance of the mullah, the role of the Political Agency has continued to erode both due to the diminished quality and rank of the civil servants assigned to the position and due to the ever-expanding corruption within the agency since In recent years, the army has further supplanted the PA's authority in key agencies such as North and South Waziristan.
Taking note of these varied changes in FATA, several panel speakers argued that the foundations of Pashtun identity have changed with perhaps a permanent turn toward Islamism and movement away from traditional secular, tribal leadership.
It would seem that new centers of power, the influence of political Islam and the rise of the mullah, and the commingling with so-called "foreigners" have upended the traditional tribal identification.
A New Taliban and its Sanctuary in Pakistan One panel member emphasized that international forces now confront a fundamentally different Taliban than they did in October Initial United States assessments projected that the Taliban would soon be defunct. Instead, the Taliban has replenished its revenues, recruited new cadres, and adopted Iraq-like tactics, such as improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers.
Inthere were six suicide bombings in Afghanistan compared with approximately 90 such attacks so far in This rejuvenated Taliban is not simply confined to guerilla-style warfare. Now, large units of Taliban fighters also confront U. The Taliban has a robust sanctuary in Pakistan's tribal areas and this is a major factor in their resurgence. The tribal areas have historically been "no-go" zones for the Pakistani military, and the Pakistan armed forces have not performed well in operations there since More disturbing is the panelists' observations that sincePakistan appears more ambivalent about pressuring the Taliban and rolling back their protected zone.
Several speakers expressed concern that the "peace deals" signed by the government and militants in South Waziristan in and in North Waziristan in September undercut international efforts to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan and to deny access to their safe haven in FATA. These deals and the way in which they were negotiated suggest that the government surrendered to the militants while giving thin assurances of militants' future good behavior.
As a consequence, militant and Islamist leaders emerged as triumphant victors over a vanquished Pakistani army, thus eroding any vestiges of authority exercised by the government in FATA. Pakistan's Will Versus Pakistan's Ability To Do More Some participants questioned Pakistan's intentions vis-a-vis the Taliban and allied fighters, suggesting that the intelligence services could do more to exert control over the area if it chose to do so.
Several speakers also questioned the capabilities of the Pakistani army, noting that they are less capable than is generally believed. One panelist pointed out that the Pakistani army seems too focused on technological enhancements such as artillery, precision-guided munitions, and night-vision goggles. Without this commitment, there is little prospect for Pakistan rolling back the sanctuary of the Taliban and its allied fighters.
These assertions were challenged, however, by an attendee with extensive knowledge of the Pakistani army. Leaving that debate aside, another speaker argued that it matters little whether the Pakistani army is committed because, at this point, Pakistan simply cannot deliver what Kabul and the international community demands.
President Musharraf lacks credibility and his diminished domestic standing constrains him considerably. However, President Musharraf cannot ignore the external pressure to "remain committed. Both FATA and Baluchistan are fast becoming "states within states," with separate systems of taxation and justice, while Islamabad seems unable to reverse course.
The attack in Bajour may have the unintended consequence of displaying President Musharraf's weakness despite his best efforts to appear capable and in charge.
The most important among them was the split of the Afghan Pashtun area into two parts, belonging to Kabul the Afghan kingdom and British India.
The struggle of part of the Pashtuns of India for independence either in United India or outside it, within the framework of the independent Pashtunistan, ended in failure. The formation of Pakistan with the inclusion of the lands of the eastern Pashtuns led to difficulties and problems in the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The history of Pakistani-Afghan relations is divided into six major stages. The first stage from the late s to the mids is characterized by the attempts of the Afghan authorities to use the fact that Pakistan was an entirely new political entity that appeared in after the simultaneous voluntary and forced withdrawal of the colonialists from Hindustan.
The difficulties of the initial stage of the formation of the borders and the territorial structure of the Pakistani state allowed Kabul to pursue an offensive policy towards the neighbor, seeking to secure access to the Arabian Sea with support for the separatist autonomist in Pakistan.
The first period was marked by the efforts of the Afghan authorities to get Pakistan to abandon the border along the Durand Line and from the ownership of the eastern Pashtun territories to Pakistan. The second period lasted from the mids to the turn of the s and s. After overcoming the acute crisis in bilateral relations the early sa period of relative equilibrium began, which was not violated even by the wars of Pakistan with India in and The third stage covers the s. Pakistan, losing as a result of the events of its eastern province, transformed into an independent state of Bangladesh.
Since the mids, the role of the Islamic factor in regional politics has increased, and Pakistan has become one of the hotbeds of Islamization from above.
Khwaja Khidr 32—34 north Anderson in concert with various Afghan chiefs King issued a report dated 8 March on the demarcation of the section from Khwaja Khidr to Domandi 31—55 north by 31 pillars. The line from Domandi to New Chaman 30—55 north, east was marked by 92 pillars by a joint demarcation commission led by Captain later Lt.
McMahon also led the demarcation commission with Muhammad Umar Khan which marked the boundary from new Chaman to Concurrently, Afridi tribesmen began rising up in arms against the British, creating a zone of instability between Peshawar and the Durand Line. Further, frequent skirmishes and wars between the Afghan state and the British Raj starting in the s made travel between Peshawar and Jalalabad almost impossible. As a result, travel across the boundary was almost entirely halted.
Pakistan's Khan Calls for 'Open Borders' With Afghanistan
Further, the British recruited tens of thousands of local Pashtuns into the British Indian Army and stationed them throughout British India and southeast Asia.
Exposure to India, combined with the ease of travel eastwards into Punjab and the difficulty of travel towards Afghanistan, led many Pashtuns to orient themselves towards the heartlands of British India and away from Kabul. By the time of Indian independence, political opinion was divided into those who supported a homeland for Muslim Indians in the shape of Pakistanthose who supported reunification with Afghanistan, and those who believed that a united India would be a better option.Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations (CSS family)
British Indian Empire declares war on Afghanistan[ edit ] Further information: Afghanistan—Pakistan relationsWar in Afghanistan —presentand Afghan civil war disambiguation Pakistan inherited the agreement and the subsequent Treaty of Rawalpindi after the partition from the British India in