Fiasco in Nairobi — Central Intelligence Agency
Relations between the United States and Turkey have come under increasing strain in the past two years over the U.S. role in Syria and. From a historical point of view, relations between Turkey and the United States are multidimensional and based on mutual respect and interest. As NATO allies. Among members of the movement, the relationships with the Kenyan state are presented as very good. jingle-bells.info, a Turkish teacher working at.
It was compelled to adopt structural adjustment plans in various sectors, including the education system.
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Facing this diversification of educational offer, the wealthiest Kenyan families started developing strategies in order to guarantee success to their children Consequently, from tothe number of private primary schools was multiplied by 8 in Kenya. These private schools sought to reach excellence by getting the best results in the national exams: Those exams are critical into determining the further orientation of students to different secondary schools and colleges which provide neither the same quality of teaching nor the same chances of success in the future professional life.
The wealthiest Kenyan families enrol their children into private schools to get the best chances to integrate the most prestigious national universities.
Such high level schools are aimed at creating new elite. This Muslim Ismaili Indo-Pakistani community established schools which reached the level of the best Kenyan schools.
In Kenya, there are many Aga Khan Schools settled in Nairobi since and an Academy a whole campus from primary to University in Mombasa since The existence of schools directed by the Turkish and the Indo-Pakistani communities of Kenya is testimony of the communitarian fragmentation of the country structuring a diversity of religious practices.
They are very heterogeneous, since they correspond to the diversity of regions of origin Hadramawt, Oman, India, Highlands of Kenya, Somaliaand are linked to different historical waves of immigration. After the community of the Muslim Indians of Kenya, it intends to create a new network of elite who may be able to play a significant role in the future political life of Kenya.
Murat, a Turkish teacher working at the Light Academy of Nairobi declares: The support of the Kenyan state is testified by the good relationships of its officials with the schools. The Kenyan state regards the schools as a bridge towards the deepening of economic exchanges with Turkey. The visits of Turkish officials always surrounded with Turkish businessmen illustrate this intensification of economic relations between the two countries.
This speech shows that the Kenyan officials see the opening of Turkish schools as a sign for increased trade exchanges with Turkey. This echoes the words of M. Initially, this golden generation was to be embodied by Turkish Muslims only. This call for an alftn nesil can be regarded as a strategy to create a leading elite structuring a Muslim network of power beyond borders. This alftn nesil designates first of all the Turkish heirs of the movement. In Kenya they consist of the Turkish students sent to Kenyan universities to study.
Turkish students who live in Kenya tend to define themselves as the alftn nesil. Those supervisors will later be recruited as teachers. Yet the success of this initiative is limited. As a consequence, very few Kenyans become true Fethullahci. At last, a small number of Kenyan students are sent annually to Turkey 15 scholarships granted by the Light Academy in As showed by Balci, the movement is not tightly set up in its countries of mission, and strives to strengthen its presence only through the action of its Turkish supporters in the field.
In doing so, its discourse has become less focused on the religious foundation upon which the movement initially emerged to the benefit of a syncretistic conception of spirituality, morality and proper conduct of life. You can do this.
Only then did the government in Athens decide to dispatch a four-member EYP security team to enforce its orders. The agents realized they were under surveillance by Kenyan and other foreign agents. A couple of hours before the EYP officers arrived at the Greek embassy, the secretary of the embassy received a call from Papaioanou at the Foreign Ministry, who asked him to take detailed notes as he provided new directions.
These, he warned, were to be followed to the letter: The grandmother Ocalan is to be removed immediately. A room for him should be booked at a local hotel. He was to be given a little bit of money if necessary. He was to be taken to a location near the hotel, even if wrapped in a bed sheet. He and his associates were to be abandoned and any communication with him ended at that point. Everything had to be finished by Monday, the next day.
And finished it was, but apparently not as the Greeks had intended—at least not as Kalenteridis had intended. On Monday, 15 February, Costoulas was summoned to the Kenyan Foreign Ministry and told that the Kenyan government knew Ocalan was hiding at the residence. Athens asked for details about the aircraft and its flight plan but was rebuffed. The Kenyan government also refused to permit the Greeks to use their embassy car—sovereign territory—to take Ocalan to the airport, insisting instead that Kenyan government cars be used.
After intense negotiations in the embassy, Ocalan boarded a Kenyan government vehicle—without his aides and without any Greek official. He was driven to the airport and placed on a waiting plane, where Turkish agents seized, shackled, gagged, and blindfolded him. What went wrong for the Greeks?
Kalenteridis and his team were to take Ocalan to a temporary secure location outside of Greece from which Ocalan could find permanent refuge elsewhere. The mission was to proceed in a way that no other country would know that Greece was harboring and helping Ocalan. Ocalan was to be protected from any agents seeking to seize him and transfer him to Turkey.
Those objectives would fall victim to international pressure, as we have seen, but in all probability the operation was compromised very soon after it began, and the Greeks should have known it.
The decision to take Ocalan to Kenya was a poor one. In addition, Kenyan authorities would most likely have been on high alert and, even if they were not, they were unlikely to have been helpful in any effort that might have implied support for a declared terrorist like Ocalan.
According to EYP chief Stavrakakis, Foreign Minister Pangalos initially wanted to transfer Ocalan to Holland, but the attempt failed because Dutch authorities refused landing rights because a large crowd of Kurds had gathered at the airport.
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Pangalos later claimed that the EYP had suggested Kenya as a way station while negotiations with South Africa took place. The tradecraft of the EYP and other components of the Greek government were exceedingly lax.
Members of the organization paid inadequate attention to communications security, counterintelligence, protection of sources and methods, as well as threats to the security of the personnel involved in the mission. Leaked documents indicate that both the Turkish and US governments knew Ocalan was in Greece and knew when he was transferred to Kenya. The documents show that the Turkish embassy in Athens made an inquiry to the Greek Foreign Ministry while Ocalan was still in Athens; in addition, the request of the US embassy in Kenya for a meeting with ambassador mentioned above also implied knowledge of the situation.
Embassy communications practices most likely contributed to compromises. The most critical field communications of the operation, specifically from EYP headquarters in Athens, took place entirely by telephone—even payphones. Moreover, not everyone was addressed with a codename. The lead field agent, Kalenteridis, was always addressed by his given name, according to the leaked documents.
Finally, the physical security of Ocalan, his aides, and the escorting team was inadequate. As Stavrakakis later noted, the Public Order Ministry had provided too few security personnel for the mission, even leaving them unarmed. The chain of command was broken as senior officials of ministry rank became intimately involved in the operation. Testimony during the trial and leaked Greek government reports make clear that ministerial rank officials were involved in the macro- and micro-management of the operation.
Such breakdowns in the routine chain of command can signal failings in authority above; create uncertainty in the field; and permit, or force, field operators to question and even challenge their orders, especially when a core mission has changed so clearly and rapidly. A qualified selection to head an autonomous operation such as this one would ideally have the knowledge and expertise appropriate to the nature and location of the mission.
These include fluency in specific foreign languages, knowledge of specific cultures and locations, and so on. These, on the surface at least, Kalenteridis had. Kalenteridis was born in in the small town of Vergi near the northern Greek city of Serres. Vergi is a historical one, home to several ancient ruins of the archaic era — BCE. Kalenteridis graduated in with the rank of second lieutenant.
- Kenya–Turkey relations
- Relations between Turkey and the United States of America
- Kenya–United States relations
He went on to serve in several tank and paratroop units in Greece and in posts abroad. His fluency in Turkish and knowledge of foreign affairs made him an asset to the National Intelligence Agency, for which Kalenteridis worked covertly for several years, mainly in Turkey.
At the same time, there should have been suspicions about his suitability for the sensitive mission. The task apparently had not been assigned or sanctioned by the EYP. Kitsos told his superiors that he had concluded that a component of EYP was operating autonomously and that officers in that component were prone to disobey official government orders.